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Abstract
It is assumed that relations between n players are reflected by a directed
graph or digraph. Such a digraph is called invariant if there is an arc
between any two players between whom there is also a directed path.
We characterize a class of power indices for invariant digraphs based on
four axioms: Null Player, Constant Sum, Anonymity, and the Transfer
Property. This class is determined by 2n − 2 parameters. By consider-
ing additional conditions about the effect of adding a directed link (arc)
between two players we single out three different, one parameter families
of power indices, reflecting several well-known indices from the literature:
Copeland score, β- and apex-type indices.
JEL-Classification numbers C71
Keywords Digraph, power index, transfer property, link addition
1 Introduction
We consider situations where the relations between n players are reflected by a
directed graph or digraph. There are several interpretations possible. A directed
link (or arc) from player i to player j may reflect that player i controls player j,
for instance i is an investor who has the majority of the shares of firm j. With
this interpretation our paper is related to Gambarelli and Owen (1994), where
the players are firms or investment companies. It is also a special case of the
approach by Hu and Shapley (2003a,b) and of the mutual control structures of
Karos and Peters (2015). Somewhat related, our model can also be seen as a
permission structure as introduced in Gilles et al (1992). A directed link from
player i to player j then reflects the fact that player j needs the permission of
player i in order to cooperate with other players. Still another interpretation
is an information structure: player j can get information from player i only if
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there is a directed link from player i to player j. These are applications where
the links are between decision making agents. Other types of applications have
the arcs representing the results of matches played among teams in a sports
competition, or the structure of links between internet pages.
A digraph will be called invariant if for any two players who are connected
via a directed path, there is also a direct link.1 For instance, in the control
interpretation, if player i controls player j and j controls k then player i controls
k indirectly; in an invariant digraph there will be a direct link between i and k.
An invariant digraph is a special case of an invariant mutual control structure
studied in Karos and Peters (2015).
Our aim in this paper is to study power indices, reflecting the power of play-
ers as a consequence of their positions in the digraph. Following Karos and
Peters (2015), we impose four axioms on a power index: Null Player, Constant
Sum, Anonymity, and the Transfer Property. The Transfer Property (first in-
troduced in a different format by Dubey, 1975) is an additivity condition in
the spirit of Shapley (1953). It is the main tool to ensure that a power index is
completely determined by its values on digraphs of an elementary form. In these
elementary digraphs there is a set M of players who each have a link to one
and the same player j. Due to the Anonymity condition, only the cardinality
of M matters, but it makes a difference whether or not player j is in M : this is
why we arrive at a class of power indices with 2(n− 1) degrees of freedom (pa-
rameters). The Null Player axiom ensures that players outside M (other than
possibly j) have zero power. Combined with the Constant Sum axiom we obtain
that the sum of the player powers is always 0. This is in contrast with usual
power indices (e.g., Shapley and Shubik, 1954; see also Gambarelli, 1994, and
Gambarelli and Stach, 2009), where power is between 0 and 1, with total 1. In
our approach it is natural to allow for negative power. A null player is a player
who has neither incoming nor outgoing links in the digraph, and it is natural to
assign power 0 to such a player. In turn then, it is equally natural to allow for
negative power for a player who has only incoming links. Our main result here
(Theorem 4.4) is related to the main result in Karos and Peters (2015), but it
nevertheless requires a new and different, though less involved, proof.
The Constant Sum axiom and the possibility of negative power are two
features by which the indices in this paper distinguish themselves from digraph
power measures such as the outdegree and β-measure, axiomatized in van den
Brink and Gilles (2000), which both satisfy a normalization that implies that the
sum of powers of the players depends on the digraph. We find three subclasses,
related to the Copeland score, β-measure and apex-measure, by imposing three
different additional conditions with respect to link addition.2 First, we impose
1Such digraphs are often called transitive. For more general mutual control structures as
in Karos and Peters (2015), invariance is stronger than transitivity.
2The effect of link addition was introduced in communication graph games by Myerson
(1977), who introduced the axiom of fairness, stating that deleting an undirected communi-
cation link between two players has the same effect on their payoffs. Together with so-called
component efficiency this characterizes a Shapley type solution, later referred to as the My-
erson value.
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the condition that adding a link from a player i to a player j does not change
the power of the players who already had a link to player j. This may make
sense, for instance, in a situation where player j has to do tasks for players who
have a link to j – assuming there is no capacity constraint on what player j can
do. Imposing this condition (called Link Addition 1) on top of the four basic
conditions above singles out a one-parameter family of power indices closely
related to the Copeland score (Copeland, 1951) from social choice theory: the
power of a player is proportional to the number of players to who he has a link
minus the number of players who have a link to him.
The next condition requires that adding a link does not change the power
of a player j to whom this link is incoming. This will imply that now the
players that already had a link to j have to share the power they had with the
newcomer. Also this condition (Link Addition 2) singles out a one-parameter
family of power indices, this time closely related to the concept of a β-measure
as in van den Brink and Gilles (2000) and van den Brink and Borm (2002).
The final condition that we consider (Link Addition 3) requires that adding
a link from player i to player j equally increases or reduces the power of i and
j. Again, we obtain a one-parameter family of power indices, with the property
that incoming links have no effect on a player’s power. These power indices are
similar to the apex-type power index in van den Brink (2002).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces invariant
digraphs, Section 3 the main axioms for a power index, Section 4 the main
characterization result, and Section 5 the refinements based on Link Addition
axioms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
For a set A we denote by P (A) the set of all subsets of A, and by P0(A) the set
of all nonempty subsets of A. By |A| we denote the number of elements of A.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 denote the set of players. Elements of P (N)
are called coalitions. A directed graph or digraph on N is a map C : P (N) →
P (N) satisfying C(∅) = ∅ and C(S) = ∪i∈SC(i) for every S ∈ P0(N).3 Hence, a
digraph C is completely determined by its values C(i) for i ∈ N . The graphical
interpretation of a digraph C is, indeed, that there is an arc from i ∈ N to j ∈ N
if and only if j ∈ C(i).4 As mentioned in the Introduction, various interpreta-
tions with respect to applications are possible. The set C(i) can be interpreted
as the set of players controlled by player i (cf. Hu and Shapley, 2003a,b; Karos
and Peters, 2015), or the set of players who need permission from i (Gilles et al,
1992); or the set of players to whom player i can communicate, etc. The reason
for defining a digraph not just for singletons lies in the axiomatic approach to
power indices later on. Observe that a digraph C is trivially monotonic: if
3In this way, digraphs can be seen as a special case of mutual control structures, see Karos
and Peters (2015).
4Usually, what we call players are called nodes or vertices in a digraph. Because of the
applications we have in mind, we refer to them as players.
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S, T ∈ P (N) and S ⊆ T then C(S) ⊆ C(T ).
For a digraph C, a directed path from i ∈ N to j ∈ N is a sequence
(i1, i2), (i2, i3), . . . , (ik, ik+1) ∈ N × N for some k ∈ N such that i`+1 ∈ C(i`)
for each ` = 1, . . . , k, i = i1, and j = ik+1. A digraph C is invariant if for all
i, j ∈ N , if there is a directed path from i to j, then j ∈ C(i).5 The expression
‘invariant’ refers to the fact that in an invariant digraph adding a link between
players having a directed path connecting them, does not change the digraph.
For instance, in the interpretation of a digraph as a mutual control structure as
in Karos and Peters (2015), invariance means that all ‘indirect’ control relations
are already included as direct controls.
Note that an arbitrary digraph can be made invariant by simply adding
arcs for every pair of players between whom there exists a directed path.6 The
following observation, the easy proof of which is omitted, will be convenient in
the sequel.
Lemma 2.1. Let C be a digraph. Then C is invariant if and only if C(i ∪
C(i)) = C(i) for all i ∈ N .
We denote the set of all digraphs (on N) by D and the set of all invariant
digraphs by D∗.
In the sequel the following observations will be relevant. For C,D ∈ D define
C ∪D and C ∩D by (C ∪D)(S) = C(S)∪D(S) and (C ∩D)(S) = C(S)∩D(S)
for all S ∈ P (N). Then C ∪D ∈ D but even if C,D ∈ D∗ then not necessarily
C ∪D ∈ D∗. See the following example.
Example 2.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let C,D ∈ D∗ be defined by C(1) =
2, D(2) = 3, and C(i) = ∅ and D(i) = ∅ in the remaining cases.7 Then
(C ∪D)(1) = 2 and (C ∪D)(2) = 3 but 3 /∈ (C ∪D)(1), so that C ∪D /∈ D∗.
(See also Remark 2.9 in Karos and Peters, 2015.)
Further, if C,D ∈ D∗ then not necessarily C ∩ D ∈ D, but if in that case
C ∩ D ∈ D then also C ∩ D ∈ D∗. The latter follows as in Karos and Peters
(2015), and is also straightforward to prove by using Lemma 2.1; for the former
see the following example.
Example 2.3. Let n ≥ 4 and let C(1) = 3, C(2) = 4, D(1) = 4, D(2) = 3,
and C(i) = D(i) = ∅ for all i 6= 1, 2. Then C,D ∈ D∗ but C ∩ D /∈ D since
(C ∩D)(i) = ∅ for all i but (C ∩D)(12) = 34.
Example 2.3 in fact shows that our definition of the intersection C ∩ D of
two digraphs cannot be restricted to taking intersections for singleton coalitions
only and then extend to arbitrary coalitions by taking unions.
5These digraphs are often refered to as transitive digraphs.
6See Karos and Peters, 2015, or Hu and Shapley, 2003 a,b, for procedures to make more
general control structures invariant.
7Here and elsewhere we often omit set braces if confusion is unlikely.
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3 Axioms for a power index
We consider power indices for invariant digraphs. A power index is a map
ϕ : D∗ → RN . We propose four basic axioms, in the spirit of the standard
axioms of the Shapley (1953) value for cooperative games. As in Karos and
Peters (2015) we will then prove that these four axioms characterize a large,
(2n− 2)-parameter family of power indices.
We say that i ∈ N is a null player in C ∈ D∗ if C(i) = ∅ and i /∈ C(N):
player i is an isolated node in the digraph. The digraph in which every player
is a null player, is denoted by O, i.e., O(S) = ∅ for all S ⊆ N . This corresponds
to a graph without any arcs.
Let pi : N → N be a permutation. Then for C ∈ D∗ we define piC ∈ D∗ by
(piC)(S) = pi(C(pi−1(S))).
The first axiom requires that null players have zero power.
Null Player (NP) ϕi(C) = 0 for every null player i in C, for every C ∈ D∗.
The second axiom states that the sum of powers of all players is the same
for any digraph.
Constant Sum (CS)
∑
i∈N ϕi(C) =
∑
i∈N ϕi(D) for all C,D ∈ D∗.
The combination of these two axioms has as a simple consequence that the
powers of all players in a digraph always add up to zero.
Lemma 3.1. Let ϕ be a power index satisfying NP and CS. Then
∑
i∈N ϕi(C) =
0 for every C ∈ D∗.
Proof. By NP, ϕi(O) = 0 for every i ∈ N . Hence, by CS,
∑
i∈N ϕi(C) =∑
i∈N ϕi(O) = 0 for every C ∈ D∗.
Usually in the literature, power indices take values between 0 and 1 and sum
up to 1 (e.g., Shapley and Shubik, 1954). In our case, we allow for the fact that
power can be negative. Typically, for instance, a null player may be regarded
to be more powerful than a player j with C(j) = ∅ but j ∈ C(i) for some other
player i, so that we may wish to assign negative power to such a player j.
The next axiom is standard.
Anonymity (AN) ϕpi(i)(piC) = ϕi(C) for every player i ∈ N , every permuta-
tion pi of N , and every C ∈ D∗.
The final axiom replaces the usual additivity condition known from the Shap-
ley value. For cooperative games it was first introduced by Dubey (1975) in the
format (1) in the next section. See, further, Dubey et al (2005) and Einy and
Haimanko (2011).
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Transfer Property (TP) ϕ(C)−ϕ(C ′) = ϕ(D)−ϕ(D′) for all C,C ′, D,D′ ∈
D∗ such that C ′ ⊆ C, D′ ⊆ D, and C(S)\C ′(S) = D(S)\D′(S) for every
S ⊆ N .
An alternative and stronger version of the Transfer Property would be ob-
tained by imposing the condition C(S) \ C ′(S) = D(S) \ D′(S) only for sin-
gletons, i.e., replacing it by C(i) \ C ′(i) = D(i) \D′(i) for every i ∈ N . This,
however, is too strong for our purposes: it would have the same effect as adding
the Link Addition 1 condition, see Section 5, and excluding other power indices,
for instance those characterized in that section.
4 Characterization of power indices satisfying
NP, CS, AN, and TP
The main result of this section is Theorem 4.4, which is a characterization of
all power indices satisfying Null Player, Constant Sum, Anonymity, and the
Transfer Property. We start out with proving a consequence of the Transfer
Property.
Lemma 4.1. Let ϕ be a power index satisfying TP. Then
ϕ(C ∩D) + ϕ(C ∪D) = ϕ(C) + ϕ(D) (1)
for all C,D ∈ D∗ with C ∪D,C ∩D ∈ D∗.
Proof. Let C,D ∈ D∗ with C ∪D,C ∩D ∈ D∗. Clearly,
(C(S) ∪D(S)) \ C(S) = D(S) \ (C(S) ∩D(S))
for all S ⊆ N . Hence by TP, ϕ(C ∪D) − ϕ(C) = ϕ(D) − ϕ(C ∩D), implying
(1).
For C ∈ D∗ and j ∈ N we define the digraph Cj by
Cj(i) =
{ {j} if j ∈ C(i)
∅ otherwise.
It is easy to see that Cj ∈ D∗. Observe that in a graphical representation of
Cj , the graph has only arcs pointing to j, namely from those players i with
j ∈ C(i).
Lemma 4.2. Let ϕ be a power index satisfying TP and NP, and let C ∈ D∗.
Then ϕ(C) =
∑
j∈N ϕ(Cj).
Proof. We first show that ∪k∈TCk ∈ D∗ for every T ∈ P0(N). Let S, T ∈ P0(N),
then ⋃
k∈T
Ck(S) =
⋃
k∈T
⋃
j∈S
Ck(j) =
⋃
j∈S
⋃
k∈T
Ck(j)
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which implies that ∪k∈TCk ∈ D. Let i ∈ N and j ∈ ∪k∈TCk(i ∪ (∪h∈TCh(i))),
then there is ` ∈ T such that j ∈ C`(i ∪ (∪h∈TCh(i))). In turn, since C` ∈ D,
this implies that j ∈ C`(i) or there is m ∈ T such that j ∈ Cm(i). Hence, j ∈
∪k∈TCk(i), so ∪k∈TCk(i ∪ (∪h∈TCh(i))) ⊆ ∪k∈TCk(i). The converse inclusion
follows by monotonicity, hence ∪k∈TCk ∈ D∗ by Lemma 2.1.
Next, for every T ∈ P0(N) and k /∈ T , we have Ck ∩ (∪`∈TC`) = O ∈ D∗
(the empty digraph). By NP, ϕ(O) = 0 ∈ Rn. Also, C = ∪i∈NCi.
By the preceding arguments and by repeatedly applying (1), we obtain
ϕ(C) = ϕ(C1 ∪ (∪i=2,...,nCi))
= ϕ(C1) + ϕ(∪i=2,...,nCi)− ϕ(C1 ∩ (∪i=2,...,nCi))
= ϕ(C1) + ϕ(∪i=2,...,nCi)
...
=
∑
j∈N
ϕ(Cj),
which concludes the proof of the lemma.
By Lemma 4.2 we may concentrate on digraphs of the form Cj . More gen-
erally, for M ∈ P0(N) and j ∈ N the digraph UM,j is defined by
UM,j(i) =
{ {j} if i ∈M
∅ otherwise. (2)
Clearly, UM,j is invariant.
Lemma 4.3. Let the power index ϕ on D∗ satisfy NP, CS, and AN. Then there
are α0, α1, . . . , αn−1, β1, . . . , βn ∈ R, with α0 = 0, β1 = 0, such that for every
M ∈ P (N) and j ∈ N , with m = |M |:
(a) if j /∈M then for every i ∈ N
ϕi(UM,j) =
 0 if i /∈M ∪ jαm/m if i ∈M−αm if i = j
(b) if j ∈M then for every i ∈ N
ϕi(UM,j) =
 0 if i /∈Mβm/m if i ∈M \ j
βm/m− βm if i = j
Proof. Straightforward from the axioms.
Observe that for C ∈ D∗ and j ∈ N , we have Cj = UMCj ,j where MCj = {i ∈
N : j ∈ C(i)}.
From Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 we obtain our main result.
7
Theorem 4.4. A power index ϕ on D∗ satisfies NP, CS, AN, and TP if and
only if there are α0, α1, . . . , αn−1, β1, . . . , βn ∈ R, with α0 = 0 and β1 = 0,
such that for each C ∈ D∗ we have ϕ(C) = ∑j∈N ϕ(Cj), with each ϕ(Cj) =
ϕ(UMCj ,j) defined as in (a) and (b) of Lemma 4.3.
Proof. The only-if direction follows from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. For the if-
direction, let α0, α1, . . . , αn−1, β1, . . . , βn ∈ R, with α0 = 0 and β1 = 0, and
with ϕ(C) =
∑
j∈N ϕ(Cj) with each ϕ(Cj) = ϕ(UMCj ,j) defined as in (a) and
(b) of Lemma 4.2. AN and CS of ϕ are obvious. For NP, note that i is a null
player in C ∈ D∗ if and only if Ci = O and i /∈MCj for all j ∈ N . This implies
that ϕi(Cj) = 0 for all j ∈ N and therefore ϕi(C) = 0.
For TP, let C ′, C,D′, D ∈ D∗ such that C ′ ⊆ C, D′ ⊆ D, and C(S)\C ′(S) =
D(S)\D′(S) for every S ⊆ N . Then it is straightforward to show that C ′j ⊆ Cj ,
D′j ⊆ Dj , and Cj \C ′j = Dj \D′j for all j ∈ N . Hence, to show TP, it is sufficient
to show that
ϕ(Cj)− ϕ(C ′j) = ϕ(Dj)− ϕ(D′j) (∗)
for all j ∈ N . Now fix j and observe that C ′j ⊆ Cj and D′j ⊆ Dj imply
MC
′
j ⊆ MCj and MD
′
j ⊆ MDj . If MC
′
j = M
C
j , then C
′
j = Cj and therefore
D′j = Dj , so that (∗) follows. Otherwise, both MC
′
j  MCj and MD
′
j  MDj .
Then, for S = N \MC′j we have Cj(S) \ C ′j(S) = {j} = Dj(S) \D′j(S). This
implies S ∩ MD′j = ∅, hence MD
′
j ⊆ MC
′
j . Similarly, M
C′
j ⊆ MD
′
j , hence
MD
′
j =M
C′
j . This implies that also M
D
j =M
C
j , so Cj = Dj and C
′
j = D
′
j , and
(∗) follows again.
In the concluding Section 6 we provide examples to show that the four axioms
in Theorem 4.4 are logically independent.
5 Adding links: Copeland, β- and apex-type in-
dices
In this section we consider the class of power indices characterized in The-
orem 4.4 and study refinements following from effects of adding a directed
link (arc) between a player i and a player j. Let Φ denote the class of all
power indices satisfying NP, CS, AN, and TP. By Theorem 4.4, a generic el-
ement of Φ can be denoted as ϕα,β , where α = (α1, . . . , αn−1) ∈ Rn−1 and
β = (β2, . . . , βn) ∈ Rn−1.
The first axiom says that if we add an additional link to a player j from some
player i then this should not change the power of the players who already have
a link to j. In the control or permission parlance: if player j gets additionally
controlled by some player i then this should not change the power of the players
who were already controlling j.
Recall that for a digraph C ∈ D∗ and a player j, MCj is the set of players
with a link to j, i.e., MCj = {i ∈ N : j ∈ C(i)}.
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Link Addition 1 (LA1) ϕh(C) = ϕh(C ′) for all C,C ′ ∈ D∗, j ∈ N , and
h ∈ MCj \ {j}, such that there is i ∈ N with i /∈ MCj , C ′(i) = C(i) ∪ {j}
and C ′(`) = C(`) for all ` ∈ N \ {i}.
Theorem 5.1. Let ϕ = ϕα,β ∈ Φ. Then ϕ satisfies LA1 if and only if there is a
c ∈ R such that αk = kc for all k = 1, . . . , n−1 and βk = kc for all k = 2, . . . , n.
Thus, under LA1 we obtain a one-parameter family of power indices of the
form
ϕci (C) = (
∑
j∈C(i)
c)− |MCi |c = c(|C(i)| − |MCi |), (3)
where c ∈ R. For instance, for c = 1 and in the control terminology, the power
of player i is equal to the number of players controlled by player i minus the
number of players controlling player i, which is similar to the Copeland score in
social choice theory (Copeland, 1951).8
Proof of Theorem 5.1 For the if-direction let c ∈ R and let ϕc be as in (3). We
show that ϕc satisfies LA1. Let C,C ′, h, j, i be as in the statement of the axiom.
Then h 6= i and therefore ϕch(C) = c(|C(h)| − |MCh |) = c(|C ′(h)| − |MC
′
h |) =
ϕch(C
′).
For the only-if direction, let ϕ = ϕα,β ∈ Φ satisfy LA1. First suppose
M ∈ P0(N) and i, j ∈ N \M with i 6= j and |M | = k for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n−2}.
Then for h ∈ M , by LA1 with UM,j in the role of C and UM∪{i},j in the role
of C ′, ϕh(UM,j) = ϕh(UM∪{i},j), hence αk/k = αk+1/(k + 1). Let c = α1, then
this implies that αk = kc for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1. Now suppose M ′ ∈ P0(N)
with j /∈ M ′ and |M ′| = k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. For h ∈ M ′, again by LA1,
ϕh(UM ′,j) = ϕh(UM ′∪{j},j), hence αk/k = βk+1/(k + 1). This implies βk = kc
for all k = 2, . . . , n− 1. ¤
The following axiom requires that it is player j whose power does not change
if an additional link is added from some player i to j. In terms of control: if a
player j becomes additionally controlled by some player i then this should not
change the power of player j.
Link Addition 2 (LA2) ϕj(C) = ϕj(C ′) for all C,C ′ ∈ D∗, j ∈ N with
MCj \{j} 6= ∅, and i ∈ N with i /∈MCj , C ′(i) = C(i)∪{j} and C ′(`) = C(`)
for all ` ∈ N \ {i}.
Theorem 5.2. Let ϕ = ϕα,β ∈ Φ. Then ϕ satisfies LA2 if and only if there
is a c ∈ R such that αk = c for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1 and βk = kk−1 c for all
k = 2, . . . , n.
The power indices characterized in Theorem 5.2 take the form
ϕ¯ci (C) =
∑
j∈C(i)\{i}
c
|MCj \ {j}|
− c 1{MCi 6=∅} (4)
8An alternative way of characterizing the class {ϕC : c ∈ R} is by strengthening the
Transfer Property in the way indicated at the end of Section 3.
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where 1{P} = 1 if statement P is true and 1{P} = 0 otherwise. A power index
ϕ¯c is similar to the idea of the β-measure as in van den Brink and Gilles (2000)
or its reflexive variant in van den Brink and Borm (2002): if a player i has a
link to a player j, then he equally shares the amount of power c with the other
players having a link to j, except possibly j. The difference is that player j
loses c in power.
Proof of Theorem 5.2 For the if-direction let c ∈ R and ϕ¯c as in (4). We show
that ϕ¯c satisfies LA2. Let C,C ′, j, i be as in the statement of the axiom, then
ϕ¯cj(C) =
∑
`∈C(j)\{j}
c
|MC` \ {`}|
− c
=
∑
`∈C′(j)\{j}
c
|MC′` \ {`}|
− c
= ϕ¯cj(C
′)
as is straightforward to verify, both for the case i 6= j and for the case i = j.
For the only-if direction, let ϕ = ϕα,β ∈ Φ satisfy LA2. First suppose
M ∈ P0(N) and i, j ∈ N \M with i 6= j and |M | = k for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n−
2}. Then by LA2, with UM,j in the role of C and UM∪{i},j in the role of C ′,
ϕj(UM,j) = ϕj(UM∪{i},j), hence αk = αk+1. Let c = α1, then this implies that
αk = c for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1. Now suppose M ′ ∈ P0(N) with j /∈ M ′ and
|M ′| = k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Again by LA2, ϕj(UM ′,j) = ϕj(UM ′∪{j},j), hence
by the previous argument, c = βk+1k+1 − βk+1 = −kk+1βk+1, and thus βk+1 = k+1k c,
which implies that βk = kk−1 c for all k = 2, . . . , n− 1. ¤
The final axiom we consider says that if we add a link from a player i to a
player j then both have the same gain or loss in power.
Link Addition 3 (LA3) ϕi(C ′)−ϕi(C) = ϕj(C ′)−ϕj(C) for all C,C ′ ∈ D∗,
j ∈ N with MCj 6= ∅, and i ∈ N with i /∈ MCj , C ′(i) = C(i) ∪ {j} and
C ′(`) = C(`) for all ` ∈ N \ {i}.
Theorem 5.3. Let ϕ = ϕα,β ∈ Φ. Then ϕ satisfies LA3 if and only if there
is a c ∈ R such that αk = 2k+1 c for all k = 1, . . . , n − 1, and βk = 0 for all
k = 2, . . . , n.
The power indices characterized in Theorem 5.3 take the form
ϕ˜ci (C) =
∑
j∈C(i)\C(j)
α|MCj |
|MCj |
− α|MCi | 1{MCi 6=∅, i/∈C(i)} , (5)
with αk as in Theorem 5.3. In control terms, according to a power index ϕ˜c, if
player j controls himself, then no player, including player j, derives (positive or
negative) power from controlling j. Further, the (negative, if c > 0) power from
being controlled decreases and converges to zero as the number of controlling
players increases. We note that ϕ˜c is related to the apex power index in van
den Brink (2002).
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Proof of Theorem 5.3 For the if-direction let c ∈ R and ϕ˜c as in (5). We show
that ϕ˜c satisfies LA3. Let C,C ′, j, i be as in the statement of the axiom, and
k = |MCj | ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. First, if j /∈MCj , i 6= j, then
ϕ˜ci (C
′)− ϕ˜ci (C) =
αk+1
k + 1
=
2c
(k + 1)(k + 2)
and
ϕ˜cj(C
′)− ϕ˜cj(C) = −αk+1 + αk =
2c
(k + 1)(k + 2)
so that LA3 holds. Second, if j ∈MCj , i 6= j, then
ϕ˜ci (C
′)− ϕ˜ci (C) =
βk+1
k + 1
= 0
and
ϕ˜cj(C
′)− ϕ˜cj(C) =
βk+1
k + 1
− βk+1 − (βk
k
− βk) = 0.
Also here LA3 holds.
For the only-if direction, let ϕ = ϕα,β ∈ Φ satisfy LA3. First suppose M ∈
P0(N) and i, j ∈ N\M with i 6= j and |M | = k for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n−2}. Then
ϕj(UM∪{i},j) − ϕj(UM,j) = −αk+1 + αk, whereas ϕi(UM∪{i},j) − ϕi(UM,j) =
αk+1/(k + 1). By LA3 with UM,j in the role of C and UM∪{i},j in the role of
C ′, this implies αk = 2k+1 c for all k = 1, . . . , n− 1 with α1 = c.
Now suppose M ′ ∈ P0(N) with j ∈M ′, i /∈M ′, and |M ′| = k ∈ {1, . . . , n−
1}. Then ϕj(UM ′∪{i},j) − ϕj(UM ′,j) = −kβk+1/(k + 1) + (k − 1)βk/k, and
ϕi(UM ′∪{i},j) − ϕi(UM ′,j) = βk+1/(k + 1). By LA3, this implies βk+1 = ((k −
1)/k)βk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Since β1 = 0, it follows that βk = 0 for all
k = 2, . . . , n. ¤
Remark 5.4. If we weaken LA3 to a condition LA3’ by strengthening the
premiss that MCj 6= ∅ to MCj \ {j} 6= ∅ like in LA1 and LA2, then we obtain
a two-parameter family: there is a c ∈ R such that αk = 2k+1 c for all k =
1, . . . , n − 1, and a d ∈ R such that βk = 1k−1 d for all k = 2, . . . , n. We omit
the proof of this claim.
6 Concluding remarks
We provide a summary and further relations with the literature, and finally
show that the axioms in Theorem 4.4 are independent.
6.1 Summary and further relations with the literature
In this paper we axiomatized a class of power indices for invariant digraphs
by the axioms of Constant Sum, Anonyimity, Null Player and the Transfer
Property, inspired by Karos and Peters (2015), see Theorem 4.4. By adding
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three different link addition axioms we obtained three subclasses, which are
related to the Copeland score, β-measure and apex measure. A main difference
with the last two measures is that these satisfy a normalization where the total
sum of the power of all players depends on the digraph, whereas in the indices
of this paper, this sum is always zero. As a consequence, in the present paper
players can have negative power, which is not possible in the β-measure and
apex measure.
The β- and apex measures also satisfy Anonymity and Null Player, and the
β-measure even satisfies a stronger version of NP, in which every player who
has no outgoing arcs has power zero. As we saw in this paper and as also
follows from Karos and Peters (2015) in a more general model, the Transfer and
Null Player properties imply that we can find the power values of a digraph
by adding up the power values over special elementary digraphs, one associated
with every player, where such a digraph consists of all arcs going into this
player (see Lemma 4.2). For digraphs this is also implied by Additivity over
Independent Partitions used in van den Brink and Gilles (2000) to axiomatize
the outdegree and β measure, and requiring that the power in a digraph is the
sum of the powers in a partition of the digraph such that every player has a
positive indegree in at most one subgraph in the partition.
The Copeland score for digraphs assigns to every player the difference be-
tween its outdegree and indegree. Therefore, the power indices satisfying LA1
characterized in Theorem 5.1 can be seen as multiples of the Copeland score.
The power indices characterized by adding LA2 (see Theorem 5.2) are sim-
ilar to multiples of the β-measure9, with the exception that players who are
dominated but do not dominate have a negative power, while they have a zero
power in the β-measure (and even positive power in the reflexive β-measure).
This fits well with the interpretation of mutual control.
The power indices characterized by adding LA3 (see Theorem 5.3) are sim-
ilar to multiples of the apex measure, with the exception that players who are
dominated but do not dominate have negative power, while they have positive
power in the apex-measure. Similar to the apex measure, according to these in-
dices, a player who is dominated gets higher power if he gets dominated by more
other predecessors. This reflects that the control over a player decreases when
more other players are going to control this player, and therefore its ‘self-control’
increases, but will never become positive.
We illustrate the different classes of power indices we considered here by an
example.
Example 6.1. For N = {1, . . . , n} and k ∈ N \ {n}, consider the structures
Ckn ∈ D∗ given by Ckn(i) = {n} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and Ckn(i) = ∅ otherwise.
In Table 1 we give the powers of successor n and predecessors i ∈ MCn for
different numbers of predecessors.
Finally, we remark that for an arbitrary digraph C ∈ D one could define
ϕ(C) = ϕ(C∗) where C∗ is the invariant extension of C obtained as explained
9The β-measure for (irreflexive) digraphs assigns to every player the sum over all its suc-
cessors of 1 divided by the number of predecessors of this successor.
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1 2 3 4 ... k
ϕci , i ∈MCn c c c c ... c
ϕcn −c −2c −3c −4c ... −kc
ϕci , i ∈MCn c c2 c3 c4 ... ck
ϕcn −c −c −c −c ... −c
ϕ˜ci , i ∈MCn c c3 c6 c10 ... 2ck(k+1)
ϕ˜cn −c − 2c3 − c2 − 2c5 ... − 2ck+1
Table 1: Power indices of Example 6.1
in Section 2, namely by adding arcs for every pair of players between whom
there exists a directed path.
6.2 Independence of the axioms in Theorem 4.4
By providing four examples we show that the axioms in the main characteriza-
tion, Theorem 4.4, are logically independent.
Not NP but CS, AN, TP For UM,j ∈ D∗ with M = {j} define ϕi(UM,j) =
1/(n − 1) for all i ∈ N \ {j} and ϕj(UM,j) = −1. In all other cases
define ϕ(UM,j) as in Lemma 4.3. Extend to all D∗ by taking sums as in
Theorem 4.4.
Not CS but NP, AN, TP For UM,j ∈ D∗ withM = {j} define ϕi(UM,j) = 0
for all i ∈ N \ {j} and ϕj(UM,j) = 1. In all other cases define ϕ(UM,j) as
in Lemma 4.3. Extend to all D∗ by taking sums as in Theorem 4.4.
Not AN but NP, CS, TP For UM,j ∈ D∗ with |M | = 2 and j /∈ M (hence
n ≥ 3) define ϕi(UM,j) = 0 for all i /∈M ∪ {j} also for i ∈M when i > k
and M = {i, k}, ϕk(UM,j) = 1, and ϕj(UM,j) = −1. In all other cases
define ϕ(UM,j) as in Lemma 4.3. Extend to all D∗ by taking sums as in
Theorem 4.4.
Not TP but NP, CS, AN For C ∈ D∗ define
n1 = |{i ∈ N : C(i) 6= ∅, Ci = O}|, n2 = |{i ∈ N : C(i) = ∅, Ci 6= O}| .
If n1, n2 > 0 then define
ϕi(C) =
 1/n1 if C(i) 6= ∅, Ci = O−1/n2 if C(i) = ∅, Ci 6= O0 otherwise
and define ϕ(C) = (0, . . . , 0) in all other cases. To see that ϕ does
not satisfy TP, let n = 4 and consider C,D ∈ D∗ with C(1) = 2,
D(3) = 4, and C(S), D(S) = ∅ in all other cases. Then ϕ(C ∪ D) +
ϕ(C ∩ D) = (1/2,−1/2, 1/2,−1/2) whereas ϕ(C) = (1,−1, 0, 0) and
ϕ(D) = (0, 0, 1,−1), thus violating (1) and therefore TP.
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